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NOTE
The Aftermath of Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily:
Is the American Legal System Ready for
Global Interdependence?
I. Introduction
Beginning with the ratification of the United States
Constitution and Congressional enactment of the Judiciary Act of
1789, there has been an awareness that state courts might not fairly
adjudicate the claims of foreign citizens out of prejudice or
because of localized concerns.' The Framers believed that the
federal courts, removed from local pressures, would be impartial
tribunals from which foreign nationals could receive justice,
thereby reducing the threat of international conflict.2 As Alexander
Hamilton noted,
the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as
well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the
just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought
to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other
countries are concerned.3
Because of these concerns regarding bias in the state courts,
when a citizen of a foreign state decides to sue an American
citizen in the United States, federal courts have the power to hear
the controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), otherwise known as
See Christine Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and
Alienage Jurisdiction in Light of Abu-Zeineh v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 11 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 206-07 (1996). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage
Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modem Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction
over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-20 (1996) (arguing that
the Framers introduced alienage jurisdiction because the states had prevented British
creditors from collecting their debts).
2 See Biancheria, supra note 1, at 207.
3 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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the alienage jurisdiction provision.4 As noted above, the primary
reason for granting federal district courts alienage jurisdiction was
to prevent the eruption of international crises out of perceived
injustices done to foreign nationals in state courts.5 But, with the
emergence of semi-autonomous entities and the growth of stateless
individuals, federal courts have been forced to decide how broadly
to read § 1332(a)(2).6 The Second Circuit faced this issue when a
Hong Kong corporation invoked alienage jurisdiction in the case
of Matimak Trading Company v. Khalily.7
In Matimak the Second Circuit held that a federal district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear a breach of contract action brought by a
Hong Kong corporation against two New York defendants.8
Specifically, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff was
stateless and held that stateless parties cannot invoke
§ 1332(a)(2). 9 In reaching this decision, however, the Second
Circuit undermined the policy goal underlying alienage
jurisdiction: to avoid international conflicts by providing a neutral
forum for foreign citizens to litigate their claims against American
citizens." By denying Hong Kong corporations a juridicial
identity in federal court, the Second Circuit may offend three
I See Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp.
1275, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988); Sadat v. Mertes, 615
F.2d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Section 1332(a)(2) provides a federal
district court with original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in
controversy exceeds a required sum and the litigants are "citizens of a State and citizens
or subjects of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994). (The amount in
controversy requirement was raised from $50,000 to $75,000 after the action in Matimak
was brought. See 28 U.S.C.A. 1332 (Supp. 1997).) The power of Congress to confer
this jurisdiction upon the federal courts is found in Article III, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution, which extends the federal judicial power to all cases "between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1.
5 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1997).
6 See generally id. at 79-81 (reviewing several alienage jurisdiction cases where
the meaning of "foreign state" was at issue).
7 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997).
8 See id. at 88.
9 See id. at 86.
10 See id. at 87; infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text (discussing the policy
goals underlying alienage jurisdiction and their erosion under the Matimak decision).
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major players in international finance and commerce: Hong Kong,
the People's Republic of China, and the United Kingdom." The
decision may also harm American standing in the global
community, where international law condemns the denial of an
individual's right to a nationality. 2 At the very least, Matimak
underscores the increasing complexity of the alienage jurisdiction
doctrine in an era of global interdependence.
Part II of this Note will describe the facts and procedural
history of the Matimak case and review the majority and
dissenting opinions. 3  Part III will examine prior case law
discussing the scope of alienage jurisdiction, 4 while Part IV will
consider the significance of the Second Circuit's holding in this
context. 5 Lastly, Part V will conclude that precedent compelled
the Second Circuit to prohibit Hong Kong corporations from
invoking alienage jurisdiction, despite the possibility that the
decision will erode the policy behind § 1332(a)(2). 16 Furthermore,
because the judiciary does not have the authority to expand the
doctrine of alienage jurisdiction, 7 the executive and legislative
branches must accept the responsibility of modernizing this
doctrine-if it is ever to be done.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts and Procedural History
Matimak Trading Co. ("Matimak"), a Hong Kong corporation
with its principal place of business in the former British
protectorate, filed suit against Albert Khalily and D.A.Y. Kids
" See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 88 (Altimari, J., dissenting); infra notes 174-77 and
accompanying text (discussing possible international conflicts resulting from the
Matimak decision).
12 See Biancheria, supra note 1, at 200-03; infra notes 185-87 and accompanying
text (discussing American standing in the international community and possible harm to
this standing when federal courts deny access to stateless entities).
13 See infra notes 18-60 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 61-143 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 144-87 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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Sportswear Inc., two New York corporations, in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. 8 In its
complaint, Matimak alleged breach of contract. 9 Since the suit
did not involve a federal question, Matimak alleged that the
district court had diversity jurisdiction in this case under the
alienage provision.20 Matimak argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2),
which grants the federal courts diversity jurisdiction to hear cases
involving "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state," provided the district court with jurisdiction to adjudicate its
claims.2' The district court, however, questioned its own power to
hear the case under § 1332(a)(2).22 The court considered briefs on
the issue of its own jurisdiction, then ruled in August 1996 that
Hong Kong did not qualify as a foreign state for purposes of
alienage jurisdiction.23 Because Matimak could not claim to be a
citizen or subject of a foreign state, the district court dismissed the
action.
24
B. The Second Circuit's Decision
In examining the lower court's dismissal of Matimak's action,
the Second Circuit considered three arguments advanced in
support of the lower court taking alienage jurisdiction over this
breach of contract suit: (1) Hong Kong has been recognized by the
United States as a de facto foreign state; (2) Hong Kong's previous
status as a British Dependent Territory qualified Matimak as a
citizen of the United Kingdom when it filed suit; and (3) the
phrase "citizen or subject of a foreign state" in § 1332(a)(2) meant
to encompass all litigants who are not citizens of the United States,
18 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1997).
19 See id.
20 See id. at 78-79; see also supra note 4 (discussing the source of alienage
jurisdiction).
21 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 78 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1332(a)(2) (1994)); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994) (providing federal courts the authority to hear cases
involving citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state).
22 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 78.
23 See id. at 78-79.
24 See id.
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thus permitting Matimak to claim alienage jurisdiction.25
The Second Circuit began its opinion with Matimak's
contention that the United States considered Hong Kong to be a de
facto foreign state.26 Relying on precedent, the court held that the
executive branch of the United States government is responsible
for formally recognizing territorial entities as foreign states.27 To
this extent, neither party disputed that the executive had not
formally recognized Hong Kong as a foreign state.28 Matimak,
however, argued that Hong Kong's economic and diplomatic ties
to the United States evidenced de facto recognition by the
executive branch.29 The Second Circuit found this argument
unpersuasive.3" The court narrowly defined the doctrine of de
facto recognition, limiting it only to those territorial entities whose
formal recognition as a sovereign is imminent.3' Because Hong
Kong was to be governed by the People's Republic of China after
June 30, 1997, the Second Circuit could find no evidence that the
executive branch had recognized Hong Kong as a de facto foreign
state.12 Relying on the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
1992 and an amicus brief filed by the Justice Department, the
court declared that the United States had no intention -of
25 See id. at 79. The dissent raised this third argument, although Matimak did not.
See id. at 89 (Altimari, J., dissenting). Therefore, as the majority believed, the matter
"merit[ed] serious consideration." Id. at 79.
26 See id. at 80.
27 See id. (citing Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. Maran Int'l Corp., 655
F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aft'd, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988); 13B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3604 (2d ed.
1984)).
28 See id. at 80.
29 See id. The Second Circuit first defined the doctrine of de facto recognition in
1954. See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954). In dictum, then-
Circuit Judge John Harlan stated that a territorial entity could be considered a foreign
state for purposes of alienage jurisdiction despite not being formally recognized as a
sovereign by the United States government. See id. at 552. To be considered a de facto
foreign state under Judge Harlan's theory, a territorial entity must have relations with the
United States such that, for all intents and purposes, it is determined to be a sovereign
state by the executive branch. See id. at 551-52.
30 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80-82.
31 See id. at 80.
32 See id. at 80-82.
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recognizing Hong Kong as either a formal or de facto sovereign."
As its second argument, Matimak alleged that it was a British
citizen for purposes of § 1332(a)(2), because, when it filed its
complaint, Hong Kong was a British Dependent Territory.m' The
Second Circuit rejected this argument.3 ' Noting the legal principle
that foreign states should be allowed to determine who are their
citizens or subjects, the court found that the United Kingdom had
not extended citizenship to corporations organized in Hong
Kong.36 It then characterized Matimak as a stateless entity which
could not gain access to the federal courts under alienage
jurisdiction.37
The majority then turned to the dissent's assertion that the
federal courts have alienage jurisdiction in cases involving state
citizens and all aliens, including stateless persons.38 The majority
found nothing in the plain language or the legislative history of
either the Constitution or § 1332(a)(2) to suggest such a broad
reading. Moreover, the majority noted that the purpose of
33 See id. at 81-82. In pertinent part, the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
1992 reads:
The People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland have agreed that the People's Republic of China will resume
the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. Until that time,
the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong.
22 U.S.C. § 5701(l)(a) (1994).
34 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85-86.
31 See id.
36 See id. In an amicus brief, the Justice Department argued that Matimak should
be considered a British citizen for purposes of alienage jurisdiction. See id. at 86. It
asserted that "ultimate sovereign authority" over the appellant resided in the British
Crown because the appellant was governed by the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance,
which was "modeled" on the British Companies Act of 1948 § 406. Id. The majority
found this association to be "too attenuated." Id. Instead, it gave effect to the British
Companies Act which excluded Hong Kong companies from British citizenship. See id.
at 85-86.
37 See id. at 86. The Second Circuit described a stateless entity as a party which
has no nationality: "a stateless person--4he proverbial man without a country-cannot
sue a United States citizen under alienage jurisdiction." Id. (citing, among others,
Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1983); Sadat v.
Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)).
38 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 86.
39 See id. at 86-88.
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alienage jurisdiction-to avoid "entanglements" with foreign
states by ensuring that their citizens could file suit against
American citizens in a neutral forum--would not be furthered by
giving the federal courts alienage jurisdiction over stateless
individuals.' The majority reasoned that "there is no danger of
foreign entanglements, as there is no sovereign with whom the
United States could... become entangled."4' Having rejected the
arguments made by Matimak and the dissenting judge, the
majority affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.42
C. The Dissent
In contrast to the majority's narrow view of alienage
jurisdiction, the dissent in Matimak interpreted the alienage
jurisdiction provision to allow Matimak access to the federal
judiciary.43  The dissent would have held that § 1332(a)(2)
provides alienage jurisdiction for all aliens and foreigners,
including stateless entities." As the dissent reasoned, the power of
the federal courts to hear alienage jurisdiction cases arises from
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution.45 In codifying
this power, the First Congress used the terms "aliens" and
"foreigners" as opposed to "citizens" and "subjects." According
to the dissent, the use of these terms by the First Congress, which
included may of the participants at the Constitutional Convention,
signified the intent of the Framers to empower the federal courts to
hear cases involving state citizens and any non-U.S. party.47 The
40 See id. at 87.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 88.
43 See id. at 89-92 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
44 See id. at 89 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
45 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting). For more information about Article III, see
supra note 4.
46 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
47 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting); Biancheria, supra note 1, at 210-12 (discussing
the legislative history of § 1332(a)(2)). Five of the eight members of the Congressional
Committee which drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789 participated in the Constitutional
Convention. See Van Der Schelling v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., 213 F. Supp.
756, 759 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 57 (1923)).
1997]
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dissent noted that "the idea of statelessness was not in the
contemplation of the Framers and it is likely that the Framers
envisioned 'citizens or subjects of foreign states' to be anyone
who is not a United States citizen."" Although Congress had since
amended § 1332(a)(2) to include "citizens' and "subjects" rather
than "aliens" and "foreigners," the dissent argued that the Framers
did not intend this amendment to limit the scope of alienage
jurisdiction. 9
Even if the dissent had agreed with the majority that
§ 1332(a)(2) did not extend the federal courts' alienage
jurisdiction to stateless entities, the dissent would have found
subject matter jurisdiction in the case by finding that Matimak was
not stateless. 0 The dissent advanced two alternative arguments in
support of this finding." First, the dissent argued that Hong Kong
should have been considered a " 'foreign state' for the limited
purpose of alienage diversity jurisdiction."52 Second, the dissent
argued that Matimak should have been viewed as a British citizen
in determining whether it could invoke the district court's alienage
jurisdiction.53
In justifying its position that Hong Kong should have been
considered a foreign state for the purpose of alienage jurisdiction,
the dissent pointed to trade organizations, tariff agreements, and
international conventions to which Hong Kong subscribed.54  To
the dissent, Hong Kong's participation in these organizations and
agreements illustrated that both the United States and the
4 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 89 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
49 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting). Judge Altimari noted that "nowhere is there an
indication that such an amendment intended to limit jurisdiction." Id. (Altimari, J.,
dissenting).
11 See id. at 92 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
51 See id. at 88 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 92 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
53 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
54 See id. at 90 (Altimari, J., dissenting). When the complaint was filed, Hong
Kong was a contracting party to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, and was a
member of the following international organizations: Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the World Trade Organization, the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation, and the Asian Development Bank. See id. (Altimari, J.,
dissenting).
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international community had recognized Hong Kong's limited
political autonomy.5
The majority not only rejected the international recognition of
Hong Kong as "a limited purpose autonomous entity," but also
"reject[ed] the argument that a Hong Kong corporation may be
recognized as a 'citizen or subject' of the United Kingdom."56 The
dissent reasoned that, at the very least, the majority should have
acknowledged Matimak as a British citizen because at the time the
complaint was filed Hong Kong was a British Dependent Territory
whose law emanated from the British monarch." Despite British
statutory language which purported to deny British citizenship to
Hong Kong corporations, the dissent argued that the framers of
British law did not intend to render these entities stateless."
Furthermore, the executive branch of the United States had made it
known that it did not recognize Hong Kong as a de facto state, but
would consider Matimak a citizen of the United Kingdom.59 For
these reasons, the dissent found that Matimak was not stateless and
that the district court erred in dismissing Matimak's action.6
III. Background Law
The decision in Matimak effectively barred Hong Kong
corporations in particular and stateless entities in general from
litigating non-federal questions in the Second Circuit. In reaching
this determination, the Second Circuit wrestled with what it called
a "shoal strewn area of the law."6' The Second Circuit struggled to
55 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
56 Id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
57 See id. at 90-91 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
58 See id. at 89 (Altimari, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "the exclusion by
British law of such companies was not intended to create a 'stateless corporation.'
Indeed, the opposite is true. The Companies Act of 1985 ensures 'a home' for
companies by providing that corporate nationality be associated with the country in
which it was registered." Id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
59 See id. at 91 (Altimari, J., dissenting); see also supra note 36 (discussing the
Justice Department's argument that, because Matimak was incorporated under a Hong
Kong statute which was roughly based on British law, the company should be
considered a British citizen).
60 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 92 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 79 (quoting National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860
1997]
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interpret prior case law addressing three difficult issues: (1) what
constitutes a foreign state;62 (2) who decides whether a party is a
citizen or subject of a foreign state;63 and (3) whether alienage
jurisdiction should be construed to give stateless parties access to
the federal courts."
A. What is a Foreign State?
Under the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, a territorial entity, in order to be classified a
foreign state, must have its own government which commands a
defined territory and a permanent population.6" This governing
body must also "engage[] in, or [have] the capacity to engage in,
formal relations with other such entities." In determining if a
territory has met the requirements for formal state recognition, the
federal courts have generally deferred to the political branches of
government.67 Problems arise, however, when litigants claim to be
citizens of territories that have limited political autonomy but are
not formally recognized by the United States government.68 In
such cases, federal courts have on occasion applied the doctrine of
de facto recognition to bring litigants within the jurisdiction of the
court.
69
The Second Circuit first considered the doctrine of de facto
recognition in the case of Murarka v. Bachrack Bros.7" In
F.2d 551, 552 (2d Cir. 1988)).
62 See id. at 79-85.
63 See id. at 85-86.
6 See id. at 86-88.
65 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987).
6Id.
67 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79; see also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202
(1896); Bank of Haw. v. Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744 (D. Haw. 1988); Iran Handicraft &
Carpet Export Ctr. v. Maijan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 868
F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988); Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975 (N.D.
Ill. 1980).
68 See Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991);
Bowoon Sangsa Co. v. Micronesian Indus. Corp., 720 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1983); Balos,
701 F. Supp. 744; Chang, 506 F. Supp. 975.
69 See, e.g., Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954).
70 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
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Murarka, an Indian business partnership filed suit in federal court
against a New York corporation.7' The suit was originally filed in
July 1947, one month before India was to receive its independence
from the United Kingdom.72 The district court dismissed without
prejudice the original claim because it could find no evidence to
support the plaintiffs' assertion that they were British citizens.73
The court reopened the case after the plaintiffs alleged Indian
citizenship.74 By this time, India had been formally recognized as
a sovereign state by the executive branch.75  On appeal to the
Second Circuit, the defendant challenged the district court's
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiffs had not
provided evidence that they were citizens or subjects of a
recognized foreign state at the time of the original filing.76
The Second Circuit ruled for the plaintiff on the jurisdictional
issue, holding that the suit commenced when the amended
complaint had been filed, by which time India had been
recognized as a foreign state.77 But in dicta, then-Circuit Judge
Harlan raised the possibility that alienage jurisdiction would have
existed even if the court had found that the suit began with the
original filing.7 Though India had not been granted formal
independence in July 1947, Judge Harlan argued that the United
States government considered it to be a de facto foreign state.79 As
he noted, "Unless form rather than substance is to govern, we
think that in every substantial sense ...India had become an
independent international entity and was so recognized by the
United States."80  This assertion had the support of a State
Department communiqu6 which described America's effort to
71 See id. at 549.
72 See id. at 552.
73 See id. at 550.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 552.
76 See id. at 550.
77 See id. at 552.
78 See id.; see also supra note 29 (discussing the conferral of de facto foreign state
status upon a territorial entity).
79 See Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552.
80 Id.
1997]
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recognize India's interim government through the acceptance of
India's first ambassador to the United States."
Ten years after Murarka, the United States Supreme Court
decided Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,82 a case which
hinged on a foreign government's standing to file suit in the
federal courts. Sabbatino revolved around Fidel Castro's
revolutionary government in Cuba. The plaintiff, a nationalized
Cuban bank acting in the interest of the Cuban government,
alleged that the defendants, an American brokerage house and an
American receiver for a company incorporated in Cuba, had
converted a shipment of sugar.s3 The plaintiff sought to enjoin the
receiver from exercising any control over the shipment's proceeds
and demanded recovery of such proceeds."
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff
could file suit in federal court since the United States had severed
diplomatic relations with Cuba, and Cuba prohibited American
citizens from seeking relief in its courts. The Court noted that
generally a foreign government would be denied access to the
federal courts only when it was at war with the United States or
where the executive branch had not recognized its legitimacy.86
Acknowledging the serious political ramifications associated with
the severance of diplomatic relations, the Supreme Court
nevertheless concluded that the two governments had not reached
a level of animus that should preclude Cuban nationals from
seeking relief in the federal courts.87 In addition, the Court
explained that it was not required to rule on the issue of whether
Cuba had been recognized by the executive branch because "even
81 See id. The State Department accepted India's first ambassador to the United
States in February 1947, five months before the plaintiff filed its complaint. See id.
Although the ambassador's credentials had been signed by the British government,
Judge Harlan noted that the significance of his reception by the United States had not
been lessened. See id.
82 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
83 See id. at 403-06.
84 See id. at 406.
85 See id. at 408, 410.
86 See id. at 409.
87 See id. at 410.
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the most inhospitable attitude on the matter does not dictate denial
of standing here."88  The Supreme Court further supported its
reasoning by noting that the United States government advocated
granting nationalized Cuban corporations access to the federal
courts.89
Twenty-four years after Sabbatino, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York decided that alienage
jurisdiction could be based on a party's citizenship in a foreign
state which had been taken over by an unrecognized revolutionary
government. In Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Center v.
Marjan International Corp.,9 an Iranian corporation filed a breach
of contract suit against a New York company while Iran was in the
midst of a revolution. The Iranian party amended its complaint
several months after the United States failed to recognize the new
Islamic government of Iran.92 The defendant moved to dismiss the
case for lack of alienage jurisdiction. 93 It argued that the plaintiff
did not have standing to litigate in the federal courts because it
was a citizen of a foreign state whose government had not been
recognized by the executive.94 The district court refuted this
argument by distinguishing between recognizing a foreign state
88 Id. at411 n.12.
89 See id. at 411. The Court observed that the Second Circuit, while it heard the
Sabbatino case, relied on two State Department letters which purportedly stated that the
executive branch did not object to the Cuban corporation filing suit in federal court. See
id. at 407. The Second Circuit, in Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 325 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1963), also held that a nationalized Cuban company could sue in federal court,
despite the severance of relations between the United States and Cuba. See Calderone,
325 F.2d at 77. The court reached this decision because the Justice Department, in filing
an amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court during the Sabbatino controversy,
counseled that nationalized Cuban corporations should be permitted to litigate in the
federal judicial system. See id.
90 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988).
91 See id. at 1276. After Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi's government was toppled
in early 1979, the United States recognized the new revolutionary leadership, headed by
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. See id. Later, militant forces led by the Ayatollah
Khomeini overthrew Bazargan's government. See id. The United States did not
recognize Khomeini's regime. See id.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
19971
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and recognizing the legitimacy of a foreign government.95 As the
court noted: "Once the United States recognizes an entity as a
sovereign state,... a subsequent withdrawal of recognition of that
state's government does not effect a change in the underlying
recognition of the state as an international juridicial entity."' The
court found evidence that the executive branch continued to
recognize Iran as an "independent sovereign nation" despite its
refusal to formally accept the country's revolutionary
government.97 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff could
invoke alienage jurisdiction. 9
As the cases cited above show, to be considered a foreign state,
a territory must have relations with the United States government
such that the executive branch considers it a sovereign nation.9
95 See id. at 1277.
9 Id. at 1281.
97 Id. at 1280-81. In ruling that the United States continued to recognize Iran as a
sovereign state, the district court relied on State Department responses to queries put
forth by the defendant New York corporation. See id. at 1280 n.4. The defendant,
looking for clarification on Iran's diplomatic status, asked the State Department if the
United States recognized Iran's new Islamic government and if relations between the
two had been severed. See id. The State Department answered that the United States had
not recognized the Khomeini regime and that the United States did not have diplomatic
relations with Iran. The district court observed, however, that the State Department did
not acknowledge whether the executive branch continued to recognize Iran as a foreign
state. See id. According to the court, this omission proved that the State Department
drew a distinction between recognizing a government and recognizing a foreign state.
See id.
98 See id. at 1281.
91 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-11 (1964);
Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954); Iran Handicraft & Carpet
Export Ctr. v. Marian Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 868
F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988). This definition of foreign state assumes that the territory in
question is independent. Independence can be illustrated in the context of trust
territories. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Bowoon Sangsa Co. v. Micronesian Indus.
Corp., 720 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1983), ruled that the courts of a trust territory, which was
administered by the United States, could not be considered foreign because the residents
of the trust territory failed to ratify a Compact of Free Association that would have
ended American sovereignty over the territory. See Bowoon Sangsa, 720 F.2d at 599-
602. By failing to have the Compact ratified, the trust territory assured that, for the
recognizable future, it would continue to be closely associated with the United States.
See id. at 602. As the Ninth Circuit stated, "although Palau is moving towards
independence, we hold that the courts of Palau cannot be considered 'foreign' .. . until
Palau obtains a status approximating complete independence." Id. at 602.
ALIENAGE JURISDICTION OF STATELESS ENTITIES
Once the executive recognizes a foreign state, that state's citizens
may invoke § 1332(a)(2).' Moreover, courts hold this to be true
even after the executive has severed relations with a foreign state's
government.'"' More problematic is the doctrine of de facto
recognition, defined in the Second Circuit by Judge Harlan's
opinion in Murarka. Because the doctrine was formulated in
dictum, it is not entirely clear how broadly courts should apply de
facto recognition. Subsequent courts,/however, have limited its
application by holding that, to be recognized as a de facto foreign
state, a territorial entity's recognition must be "imminent and
inevitable."'0 2
B. What Authority Determines the Citizenship of an Alien?
The plain language of § 1332(a)(2) suggests that any non-
United States citizen who would invoke alienage jurisdiction must
be either a subject or a citizen of a foreign state.' 3 In establishing
a party's citizenship under this rule, the federal courts have
deferred to the sovereign state which governs the party's place of
domicile.' 4  As Judge Harlan noted in Murarka: "It is the
undoubted right of each country to determine who are its nationals,
and it seems to be general international usage that such a
determination will usually be accepted by other nations."'0'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York applied this principle in Windert Watch Co. v. Remex
100 See Iran Handicraft, 655 F. Supp. at 1280-8 1.
101 See id. at 1281 (holding that once the executive branch has conferred foreign
state status upon a territorial entity, such standing cannot be withdrawn simply because
the United States no longer recognizes the legitimacy of the state's government).
102 Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1246 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that a trust territory could not be considered a de facto foreign state
because it would not be receiving its political independence in the foreseeable future);
see also Bank of Haw. v. Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744, 747 (D. Haw. 1988) (holding that an
island, though still technically a trust territory, is a de facto foreign state because its
trustee has proclaimed it a sovereign state).
103 See supra note 4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994)).
104 See Murarka, 215 F.2d at 553; Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468
F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
1o Murarka, 215 F.2d at 553.
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Electronics Ltd.'" In that case, the court rejected the notion that
Hong Kong corporations were citizens of the United Kingdom
solely because of the island's status as a British colony.' 7 Since
the United Kingdom had statutorily refused to extend the
privileges of British citizenship to Hong Kong businesses, the
court ruled that entities incorporated there could not claim to be
British citizens. 08
Like the Windert Watch court, the Seventh Circuit faced the
task of ascertaining the citizenship of a corporate litigant whose
place of incorporation was a British Dependent Territory. In
Wilson v. Humphreys Ltd.,'O° the court held that a business
organized in the Cayman Islands could be brought into federal
court under § 1332(a)(2). " Although ambiguous in its reasoning,
the court concluded that the defendant company qualified as a
British citizen."1' To support this assertion, the Seventh Circuit
pointed to a British statute that purportedly conferred British
citizenship upon citizens of the Dependent Territories.'12  The
court, however, did not discuss whether there was any statutory
language that might disqualify a Caymanian business from British
citizenship. 1
The Second Circuit in Windert Watch and the Seventh Circuit
in Wilson reached opposite conclusions about the alleged British
citizenship of corporate litigants organized in British Dependent
Territories.1 4  Yet both courts based their decisions upon the
106 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
107 See id. at 1246.
108 See id.; see also supra notes 36, 58 (discussing the British Companies Acts of
1948 and 1985).
109 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990).
I10 See id. at 1242-43.
111 See id. at 1242.
112 See id. The Court relied on the British Nationality Act, 1981, section
51(3)(a)(iii) to come to the conclusion that the United Kingdom had granted British
citizenship upon the defendant, a Cayman Islands corporation. See id.
113 See id. at 1242-43. The British Companies Act of 1948 § 406 excluded Hong
Kong companies from British citizenship. See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118
F.3d 76, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1997); Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F. Supp.
1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
114 See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
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apparent will of the British government." 5 Thus, just as Judge
Harlan before them, both courts respected the power of a
sovereign state to define its own citizenry."6
C. Can Stateless Entities Gain Access to Federal Courts via
§ 1332(a) (2) ?
The Second Circuit in Matimak acknowledged that the
stateless individual is a twentieth century phenomenon."' Thus,
the First Congress could not have anticipated the stateless
individual when it codified alienage jurisdiction."' The federal
courts, therefore, have been unable to rely on the explicit guidance
of the founders of the United States concerning the juridicial status
of stateless persons.' 9 As a result, the federal courts have enforced
the plain language of § 1332(a)(2), thereby denying stateless
parties the power to invoke alienage jurisdiction.2 The Seventh
Circuit reached this result in Sadat v. Mertes.'
In Sadat, the plaintiff, a dual-national of the United States and
Egypt, was residing in Egypt when his complaint was filed in
federal district court.12 The district court, however, refused to hear
the matter, citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision.2 4 As part of its
115 See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
I" See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 87.
118 See id. (quoting Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) ("problems associated with [statelessness] are of recent vintage"));
Biancheria, supra note 1, at 210 (noting that the Framers would have been unaware of
the phenomenon of stateless entities).
"9 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 87. The Second Circuit noted, "The basic assumption
of the framers--if indeed it was ever valid-no longer holds true: not every 'foreigner'
is a citizen or subject of some foreign state." Id.
120 See Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1983); Sadat v.
Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein,
133 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Medvedieff v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 35 F. Supp. 999
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
121 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
122 See id. at 1178, 1183-84.
123 See id. at 1178.
124 Seeid. at 1189.
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ruling, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could not invoke
alienage jurisdiction because of his dual citizenship.2 5 The court
noted that the "paramount purpose" for having alienage
jurisdiction was to avoid entanglements with foreign states over
the treatment of their nationals in our state courts.' 26  Since the
plaintiff was also an American citizen, the Seventh Circuit found it
unlikely that the Egyptian government would complain about
plaintiff's treatment in any of our court systems. 27 Therefore, the
court found it unnecessary to extend alienage jurisdiction over his
claim.'28
In addition, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff could
not litigate the case in federal court under § 1332(a)(1), which
provides diversity jurisdiction in a case involving United States
citizens who are domiciled in different states.'29 Although the
plaintiff could claim American citizenship, the court held that his
domicile was in Egypt, precluding him from invoking
§ 1332(a)(1).131 Through its ruling in Sadat, the Seventh Circuit
rendered the plaintiff stateless for the purpose of litigating in
federal court.
Similarly, in the case of Coury v. Prot,' the Fifth Circuit also
ruled that only the American citizenship of a dual national will be
recognized for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction. 32 The court
held that an American citizen cannot invoke alienage jurisdiction,
even if they are domiciled in a foreign country. 33 Furthermore, the
court noted that an American citizen who is domiciled in a foreign
country cannot invoke diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(1)
because he cannot claim to be a "state" citizen. ' Therefore, like
the Seventh Circuit in Sadat, the Fifth Circuit rendered stateless
121 See id. at 1186-87.
126 Id. at 1186.
127 See id. at 1187.
12 See id. at 1188.
129 See id. at 1180-82.
130 See id. at 1181-82.
131 85 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 1996).
132 See id. at 250.
133 See id.
134 See id.
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those Americans who happen to have dual citizenship and are
domiciled in a foreign country..
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Kantor v.
Wellesley Galleries, Ltd.35 In Kantor, a Soviet immigrant filed
suit in federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction.' Unlike the
plaintiff in Sadat, the plaintiff in Kantor was not a dual citizen; he
was a citizen of no country. His domicile was in New York, but
he was neither a citizen of the United States nor a citizen of the
Soviet Union, which had revoked his citizenship when he
emigrated.'37 Finding him stateless, the Ninth Circuit asserted that
"[flederal courts are without authority to hear suits having as their
jurisdictional basis the alienage of a person who has no
nationality."'38 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, found no basis for the
lower court to hear the claim.'39
In addition to finding that prior case law required enforcing the
plain language of § 1332, the Second Circuit in Matimak also
found that precedent required deference to the executive branch in
determining whether Hong Kong should be considered a formal or
de facto foreign state.' 4 The case law, though not entirely clear,
seemed to imply that de facto recognition could be granted to a
territorial entity only when that entity's political independence is
impending. 4' As to the argument that Matimak should have been
considered a British citizen, precedent required the court to honor
the United Kingdom's judgment in evaluating the citizenship of
those who reside in its Dependent Territories.'4 2 Lastly, the case
law suggested that stateless entities could not invoke alienage
135 704 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1983).
136 See id. at 1089. The plaintiff alleged subject matter jurisdiction under
§ 1332(a)(1). See id.
137 See id. at 1090.
138 Id. at 1092.
139 See id. at 1090-92.
140 See supra notes 65-102 and accompanying text (discussing which institution
determines whether a territorial entity is a foreign state for purposes of § 1332(a)(2)).
141 See supra notes 70-81, 102 and accompanying text (discussing de facto
recognition).
142 See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text (discussing how to determine the
citizenship of foreigners).
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jurisdiction.43
IV. Significance of the Case
The Second Circuit, in announcing that Hong Kong
corporations did not have standing to invoke alienage jurisdiction,
relied upon precedent and the plain language of § 1332(a)(2).' 44
But the decision has raised two troubling issues: (1) whether the
Second Circuit's decision is consistent with the policy rationale
behind alienage jurisdiction, 145 and (2) whether the Framers really
intended to limit alienage jurisdiction to citizens and subjects of
foreign states.'"6 The decision also obscures alienage jurisdiction's
relation to international law.147  Therefore, courts and
commentators must ask whether the Second Circuit's reading of
§ 1332(a)(2) conforms to international law and, if it does not, what
effect this will have on American relations within the international
community.148
Professor Kevin Johnson has argued that the Framers provided
for alienage jurisdiction, in part, to prevent commercial disputes
from erupting over the failure of state courts to give effect to the
claims of foreign citizens. "9 In particular, Johnson cited the
Framers' experience with the refusal of state legislatures and
courts to enforce the debt collection provision of the 1783 Treaty
143 See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusion of
stateless parties from federal courts).
144 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 79-88 (2d Cir. 1997).
145 See id. at 88 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 89 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
147 See Biancheria, supra note 1, at 200-03 (arguing that, because international law
is part of our national law, stateless entities must be allowed to invoke alienage
jurisdiction since the international community has determined that every person has a
right to a nationality).
148 See infra notes 171-77, 185-87 (discussing international law's effect on alienage
jurisdiction and its consequences for American foreign policy).
149 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 7-20. As Johnson explained, "Adverse foreign
relations consequences, resulting from the perception of foreign governments that the
state courts were biased, clearly influenced the Framers. A desire to ensure, and
increase, the flow of capital from Britain and other nations into the United States, with
its fledgling economy, did as well." Id. at 20.
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of Paris.'50 Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal
government did not have the ability to enforce the treaty
provisions.' As a result, some states deployed legal barriers to
the collection of debts by British creditors.'52 The failure of the
states to honor the claims of British citizens concerned many of
the Framers, who feared British retaliation either by armed
confrontation or by a refusal to invest in the United States.'53 As
Johnson noted: "A fear existed ...that the nation would be
unable to attract much needed capital absent easier enforcement of
commercial obligations owed to foreign citizens by U.S. citizens.
A national court system was considered one solution.' 54  The
states' unwillingness to adjudicate fairly the claims of British
creditors impressed upon the Framers the necessity of alienage
jurisdiction.."'
At first glance, the Matimak case would appear to be the
archetypal controversy for which alienage jurisdiction was created.
The plaintiff was a company incorporated in Hong Kong, which
has nearly twelve billion dollars invested in the United States.'56
Indeed, Hong Kong is America's twelfth-largest trading partner.
57
Its importance to international finance and commerce cannot be
doubted. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that Hong Kong
corporations can not invoke alienage jurisdiction in federal
courts. 5 ' That is, for non-federal question suits, these international
150 See id. at 8. As part of the agreement to cease hostilities between the newly-
formed United States and the United Kingdom, the United States agreed not to obstruct
the collection of private debts owed to British creditors. See id. (citing Treaty of Peace,
Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,.art. 4, 8 Stat. 80, 82).
151 See id.
152 See Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 547, 559-61 (1989). Some states forced British creditors to accept paper money
with inflated values. See id. at 560. Other states simply denied British creditors access
to their courts. See id.
153 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 8-12.
134 Id. at 8.
155 See id. at 7-20.
156 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1997).
'5 See id.
158 See id. at 88 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
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businesses are excluded from litigating in federal court. 9 Perhaps
of even greater importance, Matimak could be cited by other
circuits, paving the way for further restrictions on the presence of
Hong Kong businesses in the federal courts."6 In rendering this
decision, the Second Circuit recognized Hong Kong's financial
power and its limited autonomy in economic matters, but was
nevertheless compelled by precedent to deny its corporationsjuridicial identities. 161
Legal precedent supported the decision in Matimak at each
stage of the Second Circuit's analysis. The Second Circuit found
legal precedent standing against Matimak's argument that Hong
Kong should be considered a de facto foreign state for purposes of
§ 1332(a)(2).' As a general legal principle, it had been
established that federal courts were to defer to the executive
branch in determining if a territorial entity was in fact a foreign
state."s The Second Circuit found no evidence that the executive
branch recognized Hong Kong as a formal or de facto foreign
state.' 64 In particular, the court applied the de facto recognition
doctrine narrowly, arguing that it should be used only in
circumstances where territorial entities have yet to be formally
recognized, but will be in the near future. 16' Because Hong Kong
would be administered by the Chinese government after June 30,
159 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
160 But see Wilson v. Humphreys Ltd, 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
business incorporated in the Cayman Islands, a British Dependent Territory, could be
brought into federal court through § 1332(a)(2)); Tetra Fin. (HK) Ltd., v. Shaheen, 584
F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (criticizing as "hypertechnical" the decision in Windert
Watch Co. v. Remex Elecs. Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that a
Hong Kong corporation could not invoke alienage jurisdiction)).
161 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79-82 (citing precedent for deferring to the executive
branch when deciding if a territorial entity is a foreign state and finding that the
executive branch had not conferred formal or de facto recognition upon Hong Kong).
162 See id. at 80-82.
163 See id. at 79; Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1896); Bank of Haw. v.
Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744 (D. Haw. 1988); Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v.
Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), af'd, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1988); Chang v. Northwestern Mem'I Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
164 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80-82.
165 See id. at 80; Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237,
1246 (2d Cir. 1991); Bank of Haw. v. Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744, 747 (D. Haw. 1988).
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1997, it did not qualify as a de facto foreign state."
Legal precedent also stood against Matimak in its contentions
that it should have been considered a British citizen and,
alternatively, that all non-U.S. citizens should qualify for alienage
jurisdiction under the language of § 1332(a)(2).'67 Concerning
Matimak's alleged British citizenship, the Second Circuit applied
the principle enunciated in Murarka: A court must respect the
power of a foreign state to name its own citizens.8 It being
undisputed that the United Kingdom had passed a statute which
excluded Hong Kong corporations from British citizenship, the
Second Circuit prohibited Matimak from claiming British
citizenship for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction.69 Lastly, the
court pointed to the plain language of § 1332(a)(2) and to the
holdings of several earlier cases in claiming that stateless parties
cannot assert alienage jurisdiction.'
Precedent, however, cannot shield the Matimak decision from
criticism. The Second Circuit noted that the primary reason for the
existence of alienage jurisdiction is to prevent foreign conflicts
that may result from perceived injustices done to foreign nationals
in state courts.7 ' In addition, Johnson has argued that the Framers
introduced alienage jurisdiction with the apparent intention of
avoiding the negative commercial effects that could arise when the
legal claims of foreign citizens are not given effect.' In
precluding Hong Kong corporations from invoking § 1332(a)(2),
'6 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
167 See Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a stateless person cannot invoke alienage jurisdiction); see also Windert Watch Co.
v. Remex Elecs. Ltd, 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that the United
Kingdom had not conferred British citizenship upon Hong Kong corporations). But see
Tetra Fin. (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (criticizing the
Windert decision for being "hypertechnical").
168 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85 (noting that "[w]e begin with the truism that a
foreign state is entitled to define who are its citizens or subjects").
169 See id. at 85-86.
170 See id. at 86-88.
171 See id. at 82-83.
172 See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying
reasons why the Framers introduced alienage jurisdiction into both the Constitution and
the Judiciary Act of 1789).
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the Second Circuit has hindered, not furthered, these policy
goals.173
Since Hong Kong corporations must bear the threat of biased
state courts when litigating contractual issues in the United States,
American corporations could face retaliatory actions in the courts
of Hong Kong. 74 And, as the dissent in Matimak noted, Britain
still has Dependent Territories. 75  If the dissent was correct in
asserting that the United Kingdom did not intend to render Hong
Kong businesses stateless, the British government could read
Matimak as a threat to companies that reside in their remaining
colonies. 76  To counter this threat, Britain might withhold from
some American businesses access to its own courts. 77 Finally, by
interpreting the de facto recognition doctrine narrowly, the Second
Circuit may have, offended China, which had an interest in the
protection of Hong Kong corporations as their future sovereign.
In addition to undermining the rationale behind alienage
jurisdiction and possibly exposing American corporations to
retaliatory restrictions, Matimak could also be criticized for
applying the plain language of § 1332(a)(2) instead of ascertaining
the Framers' actual intent as to who could invoke alienage
jurisdiction.7 1 In a recent article, one commentator has argued that
171 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 88 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (noting that "because the
quintessence of alienage diversity jurisdiction is being challenged today, we risk
antagonizing two world forces-the United Kingdom and China").
174 See generally id. (Altimari, J., dissenting) (wondering if foreign courts will
remain open for American corporations). The Framers enacted § 1332(a)(2), in part, so
that economic growth could be fostered between the Republic and other foreign powers.
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 13-14. In contrast to the Framers' intent, the decision in
Matimak could make trade with Hong Kong difficult. See generally Matimak, 118 F.3d
at 88 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (explaining that the "United States cannot act without
regard to the concerns of the rest of the world").
175 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 88. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
176 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting). Colonies remaining under British control
include Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar,
and St. Helena. See id. at 88 n. 1.
177 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
178 But see id. at 87-88 (arguing that'the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of
1789 does not suggest that stateless parties are to be included within the alienage
jurisdiction provision, particularly when the Framers could not have anticipated the
stateless individual phenomenon).
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§ 1332(a)(2) should be read to include stateless parties.' 9 This
commentator asserts that the Founding Fathers intended for all
non-U.S. citizens to be able to enter federal court under the
doctrine of alienage jurisdiction.8 ' The strongest argument for this
position rests in the original language of the Judiciary Act of
1789. I"l In codifying § 1332(a)(2), Congress initially used the
term "aliens" without any limiting language.'82 Such terminology
suggests that any and all non-U.S. entities could invoke alienage
jurisdiction.' Although the statute was later amended, this
commentator argues that the courts' jurisdictional power was not
limited. '
As a second argument supporting the interpretation of
§ 1332(a)(2) to include stateless parties, the article contends that
the international community has recognized the right of all
individuals to have a nationality."s5 Since it has been established
that international law is encompassed in United States law,"8 6 this
commentator argues that § 1332(a)(2) should be interpreted to give
effect to the international norm that a party should not be rendered
stateless.87  By ruling that Matimak could not invoke alienage
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit rendered the Hong Kong
corporation stateless. In so doing, it ignored recognized principles
of international law, perhaps weakening America's standing in the
179 See Biancheria, supra note 1.
180 See id. at 210-11.
181 See id. The First Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created
alienage jurisdiction. See id. at 211.
182 Seeid. at211.
183 See id. at 210-11.
114 See id. at 211.
185 See id. at 200-02. For proof of the international community's support for the
elimination of statelessness, Biancheria cites to, among others, Second Report on the
Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, [.1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 196, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/75 (discussing the problem of statelessness and how it should be
eliminated or reduced) and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (declaring that "everyone has a
right to a nationality"). See id. at 200 n.21, 201 n.23.
186 See Biancheria, supra note 1, at 199-200. Biancheria cites The Paquette
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (declaring that international law is recognized as part
of our law and that the courts must administer it). See id.
187 See id. at 203.
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global community.
V. Conclusion
The Second Circuit faced a rather perplexing task in deciding
Matimak. Although precedent supported the result, the court, by
denying alienage jurisdiction to Hong Kong corporations, may
have undermined the basis for enacting § 1332(a)(2). 8  With the
emergence of a global economy, harmonious relations with Hong
Kong and its Chinese caretakers should be a priority. Yet, the
Second Circuit eschewed any desire that Hong Kong, as a
semi-autonomous entity, might have had for its companies to
adjudicate their claims in neutral forums." 9 It also acted contrary
to international law, without regard to the consequences it might
have on American foreign relations, when it ruled that stateless
entities could not invoke alienage jurisdiction.'g°
In defense of the Second Circuit, however, American foreign
policy should not be the purview of the federal judiciary.' 9' It is
generally recognized that deference should be given to the
executive branch in ascertaining which territorial entities are
foreign states.'92  Therefore, if the executive and legislative
branches disagree with the Second Circuit's decision, the onus
should be on them to clarify which entities can invoke alienage
jurisdiction. To give Hong Kong companies access to our federal
courts, the political branches could amend the United States-Hong
Kong Policy Act to state unequivocally that Hong Kong, for
purposes of § 1332(a)(2), is a foreign state. As to the problem of
stateless entities, if the federal government wants to recognize that
all parties have a right to a nationality, then § 1332(a)(2) could be
amended to include these parties. If § 1332(a)(2) cannot be
modified to include stateless entities because of constitutional
limitations, the federal government may be forced to initiate a
188 See Matimak Trading Co., v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (Altimari,
J., dissenting).
189 See id. at 90 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
190 See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing international law's
denunciation of statelessness).
'9' See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79-80.
192 See id.
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constitutional amendment which would allow stateless parties to
invoke alienage jurisdiction. Anything short of these political
actions will leave the federal courts relying on precedent that does
not reflect the need for broader alienage jurisdiction in an
increasingly global economy.
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